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A CROSSROADS, NOT AN ISLAND:  
A RESPONSE TO HANOCH DAGAN 
Zoë Hitzig* & E. Glen Weyl** 
Hanoch Dagan critiques Radical Markets for insufficient attention to the 
value of autonomy. While most of his concrete disagreements result from 
miscommunications, he appears sympathetic to a theory of autonomy 
that is more widespread, and deserves response. Human agency is 
fundamentally social, and individuality is primarily constituted by the 
unique set of social connections and identities one adopts. In this sense, 
flourishing individuals are crossroads of different communities, not self-
sufficient islands. Beyond any welfarist benefits, a fundamental value of 
Radical Markets is that they aim to instantiate the social nature of 
identity and empower agency through diverse community. 
Obsessed, bewildered 
By the shipwreck 
Of the singular 
We have chosen the meaning 
Of being numerous. 
 
—George Oppen, “Of Being Numerous” (1968) 
 
Hanoch Dagan has written one of the most detailed and thoughtful 
reviews of a book one of us authored with Eric Posner, Radical Markets: 
Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society.1 It offers so much 
grist for discussion that it is the only one of roughly a hundred reviews 
so far that seems to demand a detailed response. There is much to agree 
with and to be grateful for in his analysis. However, many of his 
strongest criticisms of the book are a result of miscommunication or 
misunderstanding, which we briefly clarify here. Most importantly, 
Dagan appears to be sympathetic to an atomized individualist view of 
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 ** Founder and Chairman, RadicalxChange Foundation; Principal Researcher, 
Microsoft Research; Visiting Research Scholar and Lecturer, Julis-Rabinowitz Center for 
Public Policy and Finance, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 
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to Mona Hamdy and Charlie Thompson for detailed comments. 
 1. Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and the Just Society, 117 MICH. 
L. REV. 1289 (2019) (book review). 
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human agency held by some other critics of the book, particularly 
Gaspard Koenig.2 While the book itself was somewhat agnostic on 
agency, the two of us have since developed a perspective on this issue 
that differs from the critics’ views in important ways and that relates 
closely to the ideas developed in the book. We devote most of this 
response to briefly articulating this view. 
Before turning to the issue of autonomy, we will clarify a few points 
in response to Dagan’s broader criticism of what he sees as the ultimate 
welfarist foundations of the book’s proposals. Dagan claims that the 
softer, open-minded autonomist view that he endorses causes problems 
for the ideas in Radical Markets.3 We will show why this claim is 
mistaken. Most fundamentally, Dagan alleges that Radical Markets 
assumes an ultimately welfarist moral view.4 It does not. 
Radical Markets employs welfarism much in the same way 
economists frequently employ clearly false assumptions—such as the 
absence of income effects, risk-neutrality, and the like—that provide a 
tractable basis for novel mathematical analysis. These assumptions, 
while wrong, are analytically useful. In fact, we are not aware of many 
novel policy proposals that have been formally derived or tightly 
inspired by other, nonwelfarist policy frameworks, as these are difficult 
to reason about formally.5 Using other frameworks as a formal starting 
point thus tends to be conservative in the sense that they make it hard 
to derive novel policy ideas. 
On the other hand, stringently optimizing given false assumptions 
can lead to very poor ideas that are overfit to a false view of the world. 
Therefore, none of the policies in Radical Markets are optimal, even 
under the narrow assumptions considered; instead they are simple and 
approximately optimal under a robust set of assumptions. The book 
justifies them not just according to these models but also, as Dagan 
highlights, using a range of other informal arguments.6 This balance can 
steer a course between the rock of conservatism and the hard place of 
 
 2. Gaspard Koenig, Quand les libéraux contestent la propriété [When Liberals 
Challenge Property], LES ECHOS (June 19, 2018, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.lesechos.fr/19/06/2018/lesechos.fr/0301845012112_quand-les-liberaux-
contestent-la-propriete.htm [https://perma.cc/4DYM-FE5S]. Most of these conversations 
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debate on “Reinventing Liberalism” on October 24, 2018. GenerationLibre, Conference - 
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 3. Dagan, supra note 1, at 1291. 
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 5. While philosophers of science tend to disagree on the extent to which ceteris 
paribus claims in economics can legitimately guide policy, many hold that such practice is 
largely defensible. For two prominent articulations of this defense, see NANCY 
CARTWRIGHT, NATURE’S CAPACITIES AND THEIR MEASUREMENT 161–64 (1989), and DANIEL M. 
HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 123–51 (1992). 
 6. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 1, at 1298. 
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fragile overoptimization.7 In fact, Radical Markets explicitly rejects the 
speculative proposals that Dagan most heavily criticizes precisely 
because they are too complex and insufficiently robust. It seems that 
most of the concrete disagreements we have can be resolved by 
understanding the role welfarism plays in our thinking. 
Let us consider one example. Dagan argues that while the COST8 
might be appropriate for certain kinds of administrative property, it 
would limit choice and autonomy if applied to, for example, primary 
residences.9 While the book concedes that such an application should 
not be the first, we think Dagan’s analysis is largely misguided. 
Certainly, applying a COST to a permanent residence would directly 
limit the freedom of the citizen (call her A) on whom the COST is 
imposed. But it would significantly increase the freedom and autonomy 
of every citizen who might consider purchasing A’s home. A’s freedom 
falls by a bit, as she now must pay a premium if she wants absolute and 
unchallenged security. Meanwhile, every other citizen gains a 
potentially substantial freedom to access a good from which A could 
have arbitrarily excluded them, and every other citizen also gains 
income. Given the extremely unequal distribution of housing wealth, the 
income gained by every other citizen must on average make wealth 
more equally distributed. 
Whether this latter freedom outweighs the freedom lost by A 
requires some metric on freedom, but clearly in extremis Dagan would 
have to concede that such a limitation would be freedom enhancing 
overall. For example, in a feudal society, imposing a COST on the fiefs of 
lords that gives landless serfs a realistic possibility to purchase pieces of 
these fiefs must overall enhance freedom. Now whether a COST 
imposed on primary residences in the contemporary United States or in 
the State of Israel would overall enhance freedom might require subtler 
calculation. Dagan, however, does not offer a metric other than 
aggregate preference satisfaction by which to judge this. Furthermore, 
academic studies of the COST suggest that it would generate Pareto 
 
 7. For more on this point, see Vitalik Buterin & E. Glen Weyl, Central Planning as 
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RADICAL MARKETS 61–62 (2018). 
 9. Dagan, supra note 1, at 1298–99. 
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improvements or something quite close, and thus any metric consistent 
with preference would tend to endorse it.10 
While the specifics are different, a structurally similar argument 
applies to Dagan’s critique of Quadratic Voting (QV)11: it is not clear, for 
example, why QV’s derivation from the welfarist argument about 
preference aggregation implies that QV will reduce the role of rational 
argumentation in the formation of public policy (and there are many 
reasons to believe the reverse). Nor is it clear why his argument for its 
flaws applies any less to his preferred application of the system to 
campaign finance. 
While the virtues of the proposals do not rest on welfarist 
foundations, we acknowledge that Radical Markets largely skates over 
the role of welfarism in its proposals. The complex interplay between 
welfarist reasoning, economic theory, and informal argumentation 
about the fairness of institutions indeed demands deeper 
methodological exposition that was beyond the scope of Radical 
Markets.12 
However, precisely because we are not committed to welfarism, we 
do not wish to dwell on Radical Markets’s purported commitment 
thereto. There is, in our view, a deeper and more interesting issue 
related to Dagan’s premise: namely, that some idea of aggregated 
individual autonomy is the ultimate good. This view is reasonably 
widely held among liberal political thinkers, such as Joseph Raz.13 We 
struggle to understand this view, and, as noted above, some forms of it 
that focus on preference satisfaction (or “properly informed” preference 
satisfaction) do not differ much from the form of welfarism most 
commonly applied by mechanism designers. But there is a version of 
this view that we think is mistaken. This view has been vocalized in 
conversations surrounding Radical Markets for some months now and 
thus we wish to offer a clear response to it here. We do not claim Dagan 
endorses this view, though it strikes us that he is somewhat sympathetic 
to it. 
The view to which Dagan seems to be sympathetic is broadly 
construed as a “perfectionist liberal” one. On this view, the ultimate 
good lies in maximizing “self-authorship” and “self-ownership,” meaning 
independence of individuals from social influences and entanglements 
 
 10. E. Glen Weyl & Anthony Lee Zhang, Depreciating Licenses, SSRN (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2744810 [https:perma.cc/W6TM-YHWN]. 
 11. “Quadratic Voting” is a voting system different from the classic one-person, 
one-vote model. It allows election outcomes to be based on the intensity of individual 
voters’ preferences toward the political outcomes available to them. See POSNER & WEYL, 
supra note 8, at 82. 
 12. An elaboration of the methodological lacunae of Radical Markets is presented in 
Zoë Hitzig, Lily Hu & Salomé Viljoen, The Technological Politics of Mechanism Design, 86 U. 
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019). 
 13. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986). 
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beyond what individuals would choose or wish for themselves even on 
reflection.14 Gaspard Koenig is an interlocutor who has repeatedly 
expressed this view; he has held out the ideal of maximizing the capacity 
of individuals to engage in deeply isolated acts.15 His favored examples 
include individuals who choose to spend extended periods in 
isolation—surfing, living isolated in the woods, or choosing the moment 
of one’s own death through suicide—as the height of self-actualization. 
Many who express this view admit that no individual can truly be an 
island unto herself, but still hold out the vision of such island-like 
independence as the ideal realization and liberation of an individual 
that a liberal state should enable. 
This “island” view is mistaken about the nature of agency humans 
aspire to and what makes for a self-actualized person. The vision of 
selfhood we believe Radical Markets should be judged against is not the 
“island” vision but rather one in which individuality is defined by the 
communities to which individuals belong. The primary source of 
individuality is not independence but a unique pattern of 
interdependence. Most activities and characteristics that make a person 
an “individual” are meaningful not in isolation or independence but only 
in relation to the cultural communities that give these identities 
substance and value. The fundamental importance of community to 
identity has long been emphasized by conservative, communitarian, and 
various sorts of radical critics of liberal societies.16 Yet some liberals, 
such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Hannah Arendt, have emphasized the 
centrality of community organization to the preservation of liberty.17 
In fact, the people we know who epitomize the sort of self-
actualized individuals that seem impossible outside of a liberal society 
are not isolated surfers or renegade forest dwellers, archetypes that are 
 
 14. This is similar to the definition of “liberalism” used by Amartya Sen, The 
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 15. See Koenig, supra note 2. 
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FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED (1987); and MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 
1998). A more recent iteration of this criticism is in PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM 
FAILED (2018). See also WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 2–3 (1989) 
(arguing that the individualism for which liberals advocate “accords with” the 
individual’s communal relationships). 
 17. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951); ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 
Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). 
122 Michigan Law Review Online [Vol. 117:117 
far too familiar and scripted to strike most citizens as “original.” Let us 
offer two examples of people who, in contrast, strike us as unique. 
One is the gay nephew of the former ultraorthodox chief rabbi of the 
State of Israel. He is deeply steeped in nearly every Jewish theological 
tradition and is ordained as a conservative rabbi, but runs a “God-
optional” shul and was thrown out of the conservative rabbinate for 
marrying a Jew to a non-Jew. He knows and incorporates into his 
sermons more social theory and sociology than most rabbis, yet his shul 
is driven primarily by the contributions of a wide range of artists who 
draw on ancient Jewish traditions from all over the world. 
A second is an Egyptian living in D.C. She has extensive experience 
working for the Saudi Arabian government and her public-facing images 
show her wearing a head scarf. She owns half a dozen of the best 
restaurants in the city and is a serial technology entrepreneur. She is 
deeply involved in global sustainable development efforts led by the 
main international institutions. And she teaches and studies applied 
ethics at a divinity school and is the mother of three children, all as a 
young woman and leading light of society. 
None of these characteristics are even explicable when removed 
from the deep traditions and large communities associated with them; 
they would have no meaning to an isolated individual. Yet the 
individuals we described could hardly exist or thrive in a society 
dominated rigidly by those traditions. They are only possible within an 
open, liberal society. What makes them unique is their ability to draw 
on and combine a wide range of rich cultures in innovative ways to 
produce new and beautiful combinations, an intercultural version of 
what Claude Lévi-Strauss has called bricolage.18 In this view, a society 
that facilitates self-actualization is not one that allows every citizen 
maximal independence, but instead one that offers an ideal balance of 
rich cultural traditions that are raw material for bricolage and the 
flexibility to build new identities and cultures from these. It is one that 
helps individuals become not isolated islands but vibrant social 
crossroads.  
Our view of the individual as a crossroads resonates with many 
feminist, communitarian, conservative, and radical criticisms of 
liberalism—and yet we want to be clear that we are tapping into a 
disagreement within liberalism rather than calling out a reason to reject 
it full stop.19 We do not suggest that individuals are just their 
connections to present and historical communities, defined in terms of 
geography, kinship, culture, and so on. Instead, the individual, 
 
 18. CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 16–18 (Julian Pitt-Rivers & Ernest 
Gellner eds., Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1966) (1962) 
(describing how the “bricoleur” uses what is available in his environment to complete the 
task at hand). 
 19. See supra note 16. 
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significantly shaped by these communities, plays a key role in her own 
dynamic self-actualization through her connections to groups, 
traditions, and ideas. There is room to value autonomy on this view, and 
in fact periods of isolation may be a component of self-actualization 
(indeed, periods of isolation have critical social meaning in many 
cultures, e.g. monastic cultures). But autonomy ultimately constitutes an 
emergent property of a complex system of individuals rather than a 
static attribute of an isolated individual. 
While such a view might appear abstract and philosophical, it 
suggests several social institutions. Most directly, this view of human 
identity suggests that systems that aim to formalize and verify identities 
should draw on rather than subvert (as centralized identity systems do) 
or ignore (as so-called “self-sovereign” identity schemes do) social 
connections. In particular, nearly all properties that individuals use such 
systems to prove (e.g., educational qualifications or date of birth) are 
already known to or shared with others (e.g., professors or parents). 
Preexisting networks of social cooperation and trust will typically 
include such “intermediate verifiers,” allowing verification of identity 
properties through the social relationships in which they are embedded 
rather than through abstract or externally imposed platforms. One of us 
is leveraging these facts to design new identity protocols with Nicole 
Immorlica and Matthew Jackson. 
It also suggests that the primary aim of economic institutions 
should be to facilitate the formation of novel social communities and 
public-good-providing polities while allowing older ones to gradually 
decay to the extent they no longer serve citizens, a primary basis of our 
recent work with Vitalik Buterin.20 It suggests that property should not 
belong absolutely and permanently to individuals. Rather, property 
should belong to a variety of communities in ways that mirror their rich 
and overlapping patterns of connection. Its uses and value ought to flow 
among these communities. 
On Dagan’s reading, Radical Markets are welfarist means to 
autonomy-enhancing ends. This arrangement, to Dagan, threatens to 
undermine noble ends through a stubborn attachment to misguided 
means. We have argued here that Radical Markets are not built on 
welfarist values, nor are they in pursuit of a wholly individualistic 
notion of autonomy. On our view, Radical Markets are both means and 
ends to fostering dynamic collectives and individual freedom to move 
about them, securing a greater degree of equality, a greater diversity, 
and a greater depth of collective organization than today’s standard 
capitalist institutions could bring about. 
As a book, Radical Markets is far from fully instantiating these ideas 
and even contrasts with them in some ways. For example, the primarily 
 
 20. Vitalik Buterin, Zoë Hitzig & E. Glen Weyl, A Flexible Design for Funding Public 
Goods, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming). 
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individualistic focus of the chapters on migration sponsorship and Data 
as Labor is in tension with the above ideas. The division of COST 
revenues described in the book is relatively arbitrary and conforms 
poorly to actual community structures; QV assumes a fixed rather than a 
flexible polity. Overall, though, Radical Markets ideas point toward 
social institutions that come much closer to honoring these values than 
do standard capitalist institutions. The COST embodies the idea of 
partial collective ownership that decays to the extent that it is hoarded 
away from the communities to which it belongs. QV, precisely by 
allowing an expression of strength of preference in collective 
decisionmaking (of which Dagan is skeptical), allows variable and fluid 
identification with a range of collective communities and issues. The 
Data as Labor vision—of collective organization to protect individual 
economic rights in data and to help balance power in the digital 
economy—resonates with de Tocqueville’s and Arendt’s emphasis on 
intermediate institutions as a safeguard of liberty. 
To the significant extent to which Radical Markets falls short of its 
potential, it is because the institutions it describes do not fully confront 
the collective-crossroads nature of identity, not because they fail to 
safeguard island-like autonomy. 
